Access to Information Updates
Oireachtas Report covered it…
Mike Aynsley, Anglo Irish Bank chief executive, explains how the taxpayer will not get €22 billion back.
Just for emphasis, Aynsley speaking:
We get a big thank you from Mr Aynsley and Anglo, for the €22 billion we will never see again:
Alan Dukes (our supposed public interest director) refuses to say whether he interviewed new members of the board.
All public bodies are obliged to publish Section 15 and Section 16 reference books every three years under the FOI Act. The Department of Justice website says:
The reference books are available for inspection in public libraries, Garda stations, court offices and all offices of the Department.
Great. No sign of the actual reference book though.
So I now give you: the Department of Justice reference book, available exclusively on thestory.ie, after some deep searching on Google. It makes for very very interesting reading. After reading through it, you might see why the document was deliberately not placed on the Department of Justice website. I should say I have used this reference book for at least two FOI requests that I have yet to write about.
Some time ago I sought the FOI requests of the Department of Finance for the period January 2007 to March 2010. This has been issued (in paper format and then scanned). I have published the logs in both PDF and Google Spreadsheets. The logs give an insight into what was being sought (mainly by journalists) over the entire period of the financial crisis. Any redactions are Section 28 (Personal information).
Aside from the clear issues surrounding the dumping of information by the HSE last Friday (we are working on that in the meantime) the banking reports are also clearly an important issue. We will try to cover both of these issues over the coming days.
I am initially particularly interested in one small part of the Honohan report:
While there was eventually a broad consensus, including among CBFSAI officials, that the guarantee scheme for all institutions was the best approach, the idea of nationalising Anglo Irish Bank (implying an associated change in management) as an accompanying measure was also on the table. As a contingency (and highly confidential) precautionary measure, legislation to nationalise a troubled bank and/or building society had been in preparation for some time.
It was felt by some that nationalising Anglo Irish Bank – which was facing by far the most serious liquidity crisis – would reduce the reputational damage that it was causing to the Irish banking system. This bank‘s business model was also thought by many to be irrecoverably broken; although few participants were even beginning to think it might have actual solvency issues.
Among the arguments against an overnight nationalisation was the fear that it could present undue operational risks and that it might have a destabilising effect on markets. In the event, by the end of the week, the inflow of liquidity took the matter off the agenda.
10 Other options mooted included extensive use of Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) from the Central Bank and/or the creation and use of a domestic fund drawing in addition on resources from the NTMA. The possibility of temporary support from the two largest banks was also envisaged. None of these options could be expected to do more than buy a few days – say until the following weekend.
11 This planning was first inspired by the experience of the UK Government in relation to the failure of Northern Rock one year earlier.
Northern Rock was nationalised in September 2007, a full year before the bank guarantee. So is the entire narrative about an emergency guarantee now defunct? As Finance Minister, how much did Brian Cowen know about Anglo before the bank guarantee, and indeed before the St Patrick’s day massacre, before the CFD deal with Sean Quinn. How much did Bertie Ahern know? How much did the Cabinet know? How much did the Department of Finance know? How many investigations were carried out into the loan book of Anglo over the period September 2007 to September 2008? Why, exactly, did Mr Cowen repeatedly refer to Lehman as the the core cause, when in fact his Department and the Central Bank were surveying problems for 12 months, and why did they solely concentrate on liquidity issues, and not include issues of solvency?
Further down the report, Honohan is critical of the night of the guarantee itself:
A detailed review of the ensuing discussions is hampered by the absence of an extensive written record of what transpired. Although the minutes of meetings of the CBFSAI Board and the Authority during the period contain references to various options, there is an absence of documentation setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of possible alternatives and their quantitative implications. While CBFSAI Board members expressed some broad views on possible approaches, no decisions were taken, as the solutions would need to be found at Governmental level. The key discussions took place via the very many informal contacts and meetings between senior officials of the DSG agencies, the NTMA, and consultants; what follows relies to a very large extent on the personal recollections of participants.
And:
There is no doubt that from mid 2007 onwards Ireland increasingly faced a potentially serious financial crisis. Although the deteriorating international environment was what finally set the flames alight elements had been building for some considerable time beforehand. The overly sanguine, even complacent, view presented in the 2007 FSR and the resulting ensuing conviction that whatever problems that might arise would only be one of a liquidity led to two missed opportunities; first, to convey a strong message to the banks that they needed to build up capital urgently to be able to handle contingencies, or even to require them to do so; and second, to undertake comprehensive preparatory work to analyse quantitatively policy options available in the event the unthinkable might transpire.
… or “scoping reports” as they’ve more recently been referred to.
The narrative An Taoiseach and Minister Lenihan are attempting to set appears to be: “this scoping exercise says it was solicitors, bankers and auditors” and “we must focus the inquiry on the areas found to be clearly to blame”. That helpfully excludes policy implementation, i.e. Government. And it doesn’t stand up when reading the actual documents.
A summary of the Regling-Watson report is now available here. The one for Governor Honohan’s report will be completed later.
Honohan:
Domestic policies did not act as a sufficient counterweight to the forces driving this unsustainable property bubble. Bank regulation and financial stability policy clearly failed to achieve their goals. Neither did fiscal policy constrain the boom. Indeed, the increased reliance on taxes that could only generate sufficient revenue in a boom, made public finances highly vulnerable to a downturn. Specific tax incentives also boosted rather than restrained the overheated construction sector. And, with surging labour demand, wage rates in both the public and private sectors moved well ahead of what could protect international competitiveness.
Following on from the publication of spreadsheets containing the salaries and expenses of TDs for the 2005, 2006, 2007 to 2008, we have now put together the same for the Seanad. For the period 2005 to 2008, the Oireachtas paid out €27,177,074.19 to Senators in salaries and expenses. Here are the top 20:
Paddy Burke € 642,281.37 (Leas Chathaoirleach 2002 to present)
Pat Moylan € 545,678.73 (Cathaoirleach 2007 to present)
Terry Leyden € 523,282.73 (Address listed as Leinster House, from Roscommon)
Geraldine Feeney € 504,558.08 (Sligo)
Camillus Glynn € 502,320.99 (Westmeath)
Maurice Cummins € 501,932.80 (Waterford)
Peter Callanan € 499,885.39 (Deceased, Cork)
Michael McCarthy € 498,351.77 (Cork)
Jim Walsh € 495,986.50 (Wexford)
Paul Bradford € 494,638.65 (Cork)
Francis O’Brien € 481,749.97 (Monaghan)
Rory Kiely € 478,552.18 (Cathaoirleach of the Seanad 2002 to 2007)
Labhras O Murchu € 478,009.16 (Tipperary)
Kieran Phelan € 474,963.74 (Deceased, Laois)
Diarmuid Wilson € 473,503.87 (Cavan)
Marc MacSharry € 472,206.44 (Sligo)
John Hanafin € 469,543.68 (Tipperary)
John Paul Phelan € 442,869.87 (Kilkenny)
Joe O’Toole € 433,713.64 (Dublin)
Ann Ormonde € 427,125.03 (Dublin)
The bottom 20 were:
Dan Boyle € 167,345.79
Pearse Doherty € 165,081.70
Larry Butler € 163,652.26
Mark Daly € 160,073.02
Frances Fitzgerald € 158,008.48
Alan Kelly € 157,395.10
Dominic Hannigan € 155,628.24
Lisa McDonald € 153,411.96
Ciaran Cannon € 143,535.51
Martin Brady € 142,440.28
Paul CoghIan € 136,794.64
Paschal Donohoe € 134,109.64
Eoghan Harris € 130,529.61
Maria Corrigan € 129,868.17
Deirdre De Burca € 125,795.49
Ivana Bacik € 125,338.78
Ronan Mullen € 125,278.90
Alex White € 125,107.31
Eugene Regan € 125,053.96
Fiona O Malley € 123,798.70
Full pivot table here: Senator totals 2005 to 2008
Again it is worth noting that the period 2005 to 2008 includes an election in 2007, so not all Senators would have been in their seats for the entire period. It is also again worth noting that the Cathlaoirleach and Leas Chathlaoirleach earn higher amounts due to their positions (allowances received due to position). And again we must emphasise: these amounts only cover salary and expenses, they do not cover costs incurred by Members, for such things as inter-parliamentary association travel.
Here are the total spreadsheets broken down by year:
We were pleased to see the announcement from the Oireachtas that from yesterday, expense claims of the Members will be published on a monthly basis. It’s a step in the right direction, and important for greater public scrutiny of the administration of the State.
Unfortunately the information is published in PDFs and contain little contextual information. Open formats and more data would have been better.
For our own part, we have been seeking for the past eight months all historical data on the expense claims of Members, from 1998 to 2009. We have made some progress. In tandem with the Oireachtas releasing its figures, we are provisionally publishing the spreadsheets of all expenses and salaries for members for the period 2005 to 2008. It is however important to point out that expenses do not cover the full cost of Members to the public purse – travel costs for example are largely paid by the Oireachtas itself and are not part of the expenses regime. We believe these costs should also be published, and probably combined with expense claims, so we have a full picture. (These figures exclude Ministerial salaries and expenses)
Some figures:
From 2005 to 2008, €97,637,195.65 was paid out to TDs in salaries and expenses.
The top 30 for the period are (a proviso: the Ceann Comhairle and his deputy receive Ministerial-like salaries, and heads of Committees receive greater amounts)
Rory O’Hanlon € 789,543.77
Michael Moynihan € 726,873.65
Bernard Allen € 725,636.56
Noel O’Flynn € 723,782.51
Sean Fleming € 722,561.57
Johnny Brady € 720,676.88
Jackie Healy-Rae € 719,350.52
Dan Neville € 712,660.55
Brendan Howlin € 709,654.03
John Cregan € 704,570.69
Padraic McCormack € 699,120.51
Ned O’Keeffe € 695,606.45
Dinny McGinley € 692,391.64
Seymour Crawford € 692,011.42
John Perry € 691,415.49
Michael Lowry € 690,947.20
Tom Hayes € 690,436.23
Peter Kelly € 684,358.22
Paul Kehoe € 680,046.39
Michael Ring € 679,042.87
Enda Kenny € 676,745.95
John O’Donoghue € 675,828.78
Phil Hogan € 672,263.48
Niall Blaney € 671,759.13
Pat Breen € 669,201.01
Jim O’Keeffe € 668,538.10
Michael Finneran € 665,965.04
John Moloney € 663,295.21
Beverley Flynn € 661,031.29
John Deasy € 659,961.01
Here is a full breakdown by member
Below is the full representation by year, including committee membership and all other expense headings. Some curious figures arise. For example:
In 2007 the biggest overall recipient of salary plus expenses was Deputy Michael Lowry. He received €194,643.02 and did not head any committees. This was the highest of any Member in the Dail, including the Ceann Comhairle (John O’Donoghue at the time) who received a Ministerial style salary (earning €189,120.56, or about €5,000 less than Mr Lowry). The main reason I can see as to why Mr Lowry stands out is his travel expenses: €70,169.08 in one year, the highest of any member, and a good €15,000 more than the next highest recipient (Michael Ring).
I am sure there are lots of other curious stats in the spreadsheets, have a look. You might see slight misspelling of names (thanks to OCR processes), but all of the figures have been triple checked against records released under the FOI Act.
I will shortly publish the same set of figures for the Seanad.
We have already started the process of tabulating all historical expense claims for TDs and Senators. For reference these are the salary and expense claims for Members of the Seanad for 2008:
The Department of the Environment is one of the few bodies to actively publish FOI logs. Unfortunately they publish each spreadsheet separately for each month, which makes it difficult to get a full easy look. As a result I’ve started combining the logs into one spreadsheet. Logs for 2010, 2009, 2008 and 2007 are below:
I’ve started a process of trying to pull together Lottery grant information. It’s not easy. The distribution of grants is complex at best, but through a process of taking existing published data, and FOI requests, I will try and centralise in spreadsheets all grants made.
To start with here is the distribution of €193,981,422.00 of Lottery monies (as best I can tell) for the year 2008. The information was gleaned from the Comptroller & Auditor General’s Appropriate Accounts 2008. The county column is not complete yet, as some Departments do not give the county of the recipient.
This is not a complete representation, as best I can tell, because the Lottery Annual Report 2008 says that €267.8m was granted.